The impact of the shadow economy on aid and economic development nexus in Egypt by Hassan, Mai
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The impact of the shadow economy on
aid and economic development nexus in
Egypt
Mai Hassan
Philipps-Universita¨t Marburg, CNMS, Department of Middle East
Economics
10 August 2017
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/80990/
MPRA Paper No. 80990, posted 26 August 2017 08:40 UTC
The impact of the shadow economy on aid and economic development nexus 
 in Egypt 
 
Mai Hassan1 
 
Abstract 
Egypt suffers from low growth rates, increasing unemployment, poverty and a persistent 
shadow economy. Yet, Egypt is among the top 10 recipients of aid to promote economic 
development. Given this controversy, the purpose of this study is to examine the impact 
of the shadow economy on economic development and on aid effectiveness in Egypt from 
1976 to 2013. There is a limited number of studies focusing on aid-development nexus 
for the case of Egypt which are inconclusive of the main channels that influence this 
nexus. Therefore, this paper adds to the literature by intersecting the shadow economy as 
an indirect channel affecting the aid-development nexus in Egypt. To this end, the fully 
modified OLS methodology is applied. The results indicate that the shadow economy has 
a negative impact on economic development and a diminishing effect on aid 
effectiveness. Because the effect of a change in aid on income is conditional on the size 
of the shadow economy in Egypt, it is important to calculate the marginal effect of aid on 
income for different values of the shadow economy. Based on the calculation of the 
marginal effect, one can conclude that the effect of aid on income is reversed given the 
presence of the shadow economy. The persistent existence of the shadow economy poses 
a major challenge for policy makers due its depressing effect on economic development 
and on aid effectiveness.  
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1. Introduction 
The effectiveness of aid for economic growth in developing countries is an important 
debate for both for recipients and donors. Several empirical studies have focused on 
investigating the impact on and effectiveness of aid for development for many countries 
and across different time spans. For instance, Dowling and Hiemenz (1982), Hansen and 
Trap (2000), Burnside and Dollar (2000), Dalgaard et al. (2004) and Karras (2006) 
concluded that there is a positive impact of aid on economic growth. However, Boone 
(1996), Williamson (2009), Remmer (2004) and Brautigam and Knack (2004) argued that 
aid is ineffective and negatively impacts economic growth. While some authors such as 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Collier and Dollar (2002) emphasized that the 
effectiveness of aid is conditional, other authors, including Dalgraad and Hansen (2001), 
Hansen and Trap (2000) and Lenski and White (2001), have found decreasing returns of 
aid on economic growth. Hence, we can conclude that the literature is mixed regarding 
the impact on and effectiveness of aid for economic growth. 
Egypt is among the top 10 recipients of foreign aid. Among other forms of aid, Egypt has 
received significant economic assistance from the US amounting to $76 billion in foreign 
aid from 1948 to 20151. The objectives of this foreign aid were to improve public health, 
education, economic development, democracy and governance (Sharp, 2017). 
Additionally, Egypt continues to be a major recipient of development aid (ODA). Since 
the 1970s, Egypt has received on average $5 million, but in 2013 alone, the country 
received $5.6 million in the form of development aid. This development aid mainly 
                                                          
1 Egypt receives $1.3 billion in form of military aid from the US since 1987 until today (Sharp, 2017).  
The focus of this paper is on development aid measured by ODA%GNI published by World Bank. 
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targets the economic sector ($1234 million in net ODA as of 2015) and the social sector 
($361 million in net ODA as of 2015) (OECD, 2016).  
One can conclude that Egypt receives quite high amounts of foreign development aid. 
However, this aid did not contribute to the institutional development nor to the economic 
development of Egypt. On a macro level, Egypt suffers from low GDP per capita growth, 
unemployment, and poverty1, while on a micro level, Egypt has weak institutional quality, 
weak rule of law and high corruption levels. Most importantly, Egypt still suffers from a 
persistent shadow economy that limits the country’s long-term development and growth 
(Hassan and Schneider, 2016). Given these issues, it is interesting to intersect the shadow 
economy with the aid-development nexus and to investigate the impact of the shadow 
economy on aid and its effectiveness.  
There are limited studies2 focusing on the aid-development nexus in Egypt, and these 
studies are inconclusive regarding the major indirect channels that might influence this 
nexus. These studies have concluded that aid does not stimulate development in Egypt in 
the long run because the shadow economy constitutes a major part of Egypt’s economy, 
and it still weighs heavily on the income of the country (Hassan and Schneider, 2016). 
Thus, it is important to analyze the role and influence of the shadow economy on 
economic development and aid effectiveness for the case of Egypt from 1976 to 2013. 
The aim of this paper is to add to the mixed empirical literature on the aid-development 
nexus and analyze the influence of the shadow economy in Egypt by comparing the 
                                                          
1 During the last couple of years, GDP per capita growth was at below zero levels, Unemployment soared 
reaching 13% in 2013 and 25% of the population live in poverty as of 2010 (World Bank, 2016).   
2 Ali (2013), Abuelfoul (2013) and Emara (2013). 
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impact of aid without the presence of the shadow economy and with the presence of the 
shadow economy on economic development in Egypt.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical 
background on the effectiveness of aid, the shadow economy in Egypt and the relationship 
between them. In section 3, the methodological estimation is discussed. Section 4 presents 
the results. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1 Effectiveness of aid  
The impact of aid on the recipient country’s development is a controversial matter, and 
the empirical results are mixed regarding the direction of the impact of aid on growth. 
One group of studies claims that aid positively impacts economic growth (Asteriou, 2009; 
Clemens et al., 2004; Dalgraad and Hansen, 2001; Hansen and Trap, 2000), while a 
second group of studies argue that aid is ineffective and counterproductive, thus 
indicating that there is a negative relationship between aid and growth (Ovaska, 2003; 
Prokopijević 2007; Williamson, 2009). Importantly, Burnside and Dollar (2000) and 
Collier and Dollar (2002) concluded that the effectiveness of aid and the efficient 
allocation of aid are conditional upon sound policies in the recipient country.  
The literature on the impact of aid on economic growth can be divided into three different 
generations (Hansen and Tarp, 2000). The first generation of studies focused on the aid-
growth nexus within the context of ‘gap models’. These studies argued that aid would 
alleviate financial gaps, namely savings and investments gaps, and thus in turn would 
increase growth in the recipient country. Empirical studies at this time largely focused 
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directly on the impact of aid on investments and savings. It has been argued based on the 
Harrod-Domar equation that a significant inflow of aid creates a substantial amount of 
savings to finance investment, which in turn stimulates economic growth (Dowling and 
Hiemenz, 1982; Burnside and Dollar, 1997; Hansen and Tarp, 2000; Mosley et al., 1987). 
Thus, the first generation of studies investigated the aid-growth nexus rather indirectly 
through aid-saving or aid-investment relationships.  
The second generation of studies focused on directly investigating the aid-growth nexus, 
rather than indirectly. However, there is no consensus regarding the effectiveness and 
direction of aid. It has been argued that such inconsistency in the empirical results is due 
to sample sizes, methodologies, assumptions and data transformations (Museru, et al. 
2013; Juselius et al., 2013; Nowak-Lehmann et al., 2012).  
The third generation of studies, developed in the late 1990s, introduced a new debate to 
the literature of whether aid effectiveness is conditional or unconditional. The first 
researchers to introduce the concept of the conditionality of aid effectiveness were 
Burnside and Dollar (2000), followed by Collier and Dollar (2002), Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004) and Dalgaard et al. 2004).  
Based on a survey of 29 empirical studies across the three generations of studies, Hansen 
and Tarp (2000) argued that regressions that show a statistically significant and a positive 
aid-growth nexus had prevailed. A recent time series analysis of the long-run impact of 
aid on economic growth in 36 sub-Saharan African countries found that aid played a 
positive developmental role of the macro economy in most of the recipient countries 
(Juselius et al., 2013). However, based on another time series study, it was argued that 
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aid has an insignificant or only slightly significant negative impact on the per capita 
income of the recipient country (Nowak-Lehmann et al., 2012).  
Boone (1996) and Remmer (2004) argued that aid negatively impacts economic growth 
because aid increases the size of government and consumption and reduces tax revenues. 
The increase in government consumption can either be in the form of an increase in the 
salaries of public servants or higher military spending. As a result, domestic savings and 
investment might decrease the slowing of economic growth despite the inflow of aid 
(Dowling and Hiemenz, 1982). Additionally, it has been argued that the direction of aid 
limits its effectiveness and its impact on economic growth. For instance, if aid is directed 
to finance a domestic financial deficit, then inflation and interest rates are expected to 
increase, thus discouraging private investors and resulting in stagnation in the private 
sector and a decrease in total investment, which negatively impacts economic growth 
(Dowling and Hiemenz, 1982).  
Additionally, high aid inflows channeled to corrupt governments can lead to negative 
impacts due to the high transaction costs associated with aid reform programs. Moreover, 
aid directed to weak governments with no clear development target agendas might be 
ineffective due to pressure on and incentives for powerful public servants who have 
conflicts of interest and moral hazard problems with regard to the distribution and 
allocation of aid (Brautigam and Knack, 2004). By the same token, Williamson (2009) 
claimed that the aid allocation process is influenced by different stakeholders, special 
interests and rent-seeking activities. As a result, aid fails to promote growth by increasing 
savings and investment. It has also been argued by Brautigam and Knack (2004) that high 
inflows of aid to Africa are associated with a significant weakening of the quality of 
governance and with lower tax collection efforts, which then created a vicious cycle of 
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weak institutions and economic decline. The continuous large transfers of aid to poor, 
developing countries lead to aid dependence in which the local government fails to 
maintain and improve the infrastructure and fails to provide quality public goods and 
services without aid assistance and aid funding (Brautigam and Knack, 2004).  
For the case of Egypt, Ali (2013), Abuelfoul (2013) and Emara (2013) analyzed the 
impact of aid on growth in Egypt while controlling for other variables and concluded that 
aid negatively influences long-run economic growth. This limited number of studies 
focusing on the aid-growth nexus in Egypt are inconclusive regarding the major indirect 
channels that influence this nexus. Because the shadow economy constitutes a major part 
of the Egypt’s economy, it is important to analyze the role and influence of the shadow 
economy on the effectiveness and impact of aid on economic development.  
2.2 Shadow economy  
Most countries around the globe suffer to varying degrees from sizable shadow 
economies. The shadow economy has an invisible nature and is hidden from the legal part 
of the economy. One of the ongoing concerns facing politicians and scholars is tackling 
the shadow economy. Generally, the shadow economy involves all currently unrecorded 
economic (market-based) activities that, if registered, would contribute to the officially 
calculated national income (GDP). The agents participating in the shadow economy 
absorb efficient resources from the official economy, yet they are unproductive and add 
minimum value to the overall economy (Schneider et al., 2010).  
The shadow economy has diverse effects on the long-term growth and development of a 
country. The shadow economy might lead to negative effects on development, but it can 
also have positive impacts. However, the negative effects of the shadow economy are 
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more severe than its positive effects, especially if it has a substantial weight compared to 
the official economy. Among the negative effects of the shadow economy is a shrinking 
of the tax base and a lowering of governmental revenues, thus creating a vicious cycle of 
continuous inefficient increases of tax rates. When tax revenues decrease due to an 
increase in informal activities, governmental revenues decrease and in turn, the provision 
of public goods and services deteriorates. Therefore, the shadow economy reduces public 
finance and investment, which in turn influences the development of the economy 
(Schneider et al., 2010).  
Second, the shadow economy creates distortions in the official statistics and thus provides 
policy makers with the wrong indicators, leading to ineffective macro policies (Tanzi, 
1999; Frey, 2000; Schneider et al., 2000). Moreover, the shadow economy creates 
distortions in resource allocation by absorbing labor and capital resources from the 
official economy. Most importantly, a shadow economy has a negative impact on a 
country’s growth. Loayaza (1996) concluded that the shadow economy reduces the 
official economic growth in Latin America due to a reduction in the provision of public 
goods and services and inefficient resource allocation.  
The shadow economy also has negative impacts on the overall economy that are not 
necessary related to economic development. These include increased pollution (Biswas 
et al., 2012), unfair competition for formal firms that abide by the law that adds minimal 
value to the formal economy due to the low productivity of the informal firms, a reduction 
in global competitiveness, and diminished working conditions (Bacchetta et al., 2009, La 
Porta and Schleifer, 2014; Gerxhani, 2004, Schneider and Enste, 2000). Additionally, the 
existence of the shadow economy creates distortions in social norms by encouraging 
corruption, the weak rule of law, and disrespect for official institutions. A shadow 
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economy is thus an indicator of low institutional quality and illegitimacy (Schneider and 
Enste, 2000)1.  
However, it has been counterargued that the shadow economy might have positive effects. 
First, the shadow economy acts as a safe-harbor and employer of last resort in times of 
crisis and turmoil. Additionally, the shadow economy creates stimulating effects, as the 
income generated in it is further spent in the official economy (Schneider et al., 2010). 
Adam and Ginsburg (1985) concluded that there is a positive relationship between a 
shadow economy and the official economy.  
For the case of Egypt, the shadow economy cannot be neglected, as it has retained a highly 
persistent share of the overall economy over time, which then burdens the growth of the 
formal economy. According to estimations by Hassan and Schneider (2016), the shadow 
economy as percentage of GDP was significant during the 1970s and 1980s, reaching 
more than 30% of GDP. Since the 1990s, however, there is evidence of a continuous 
decline in the size of shadow economy in Egypt, reaching approximately 20% of GDP in 
2013. As shown in Figure 1, the trend of the shadow economy is decreasing, but this is 
not necessary good news because the shadow economy still has substantial weight 
compared to the official economy, thus hindering its development. Based on the Egyptian 
Labour Survey (ELS), 60% of informal laborers are women, and the majority are single 
and young (15-9 years old). Additionally, 68% are illiterate, compared to 26% who have 
above intermediate education. The share of informal workers is most prominent in the 
textile industry, furniture, paper and wood production, and metal and leather production 
(Selwaness and Zaki, 2013). Although the shadow economy in Egypt is decreasing, it is 
                                                          
1 Choi and Thum (2005) argued that the shadow economy which is present in a corrupted environment 
enhances formal economic activities and thus acts as a complement to the official economy by mitigating 
government-induced distortions.        
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still a prominent characteristic of the economy that hinders Egypt’s development and 
growth.  
 
Figure 1. Shadow economy (% of GDP) in Egypt (1976-2013) 
 
Source: Hassan and Schneider (2016). 
 
Given the negative externalities of the shadow economy with regard to the overall 
economy, it is interesting to investigate how the shadow economy can influence the 
allocation of aid inflows and the effectiveness of aid to generate income and economic 
growth.  
2.3 Linkages between shadow economy and aid 
There are different indirect channels through which the shadow economy influences the 
aid-development nexus and hence the effectiveness of aid. The shadow economy hinders 
an economy’s development. First, the shadow economy inefficiently absorbs resources 
such as human (labor) resources and physical resources from the formal economy. 
Second, the shadow economy limits public resources that could be used efficiently. Third, 
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the shadow economy reduces government spending and limits the ability of the 
government to efficiently finance its public sector (Loayza, 1996; Dell’Anno et al., 2007). 
As argued by Schneider and Enste (2013), the shadow economy is a waste of resources. 
Agents operating in the shadow economy inefficiently absorb substantial resources from 
the formal economy, yet such agents are highly unproductive and do not add value to the 
overall economy. This implies that the shadow economy negatively influences resource 
allocation. In return, the allocation and effectiveness of aid to recipient countries that have 
a prominent shadow economy are affected.  
Additionally, the shadow economy leads to misrepresentations in macroeconomic 
indicators. In turn, the quality and direction of governmental policies are erroneous (Tanzi 
1999; Schneider et al., 2010). Burnside and Dollar (2000) argued that aid effectiveness 
highly depends on sound governmental policies. This implies that effective aid allocation 
highly depends on macroeconomic stability and sound fiscal, monetary and trade policies 
(Burnside and Dollar, 2000). Additionally, Durbarry et al. (1998) argued that the 
effectiveness of aid is enhanced when appropriate policies are in place. Because a shadow 
economy is present in weak policy environments and leads to erroneous governmental 
policies, the effectiveness of aid is highly questionable.  
By the same token, aid might be ineffective and the aid budget might be highly 
misallocated when it is based on falsified and misrepresented official statistics that do not 
accurately reflect the true macroeconomic status of the recipient country. The shadow 
economy highly distorts labor statistics. For instance, a country with a low ‘official’ 
unemployment rate but a large shadow economy would receive less aid than it needs 
compared to a country with a high ‘official’ unemployment rate but a small shadow 
economy. Therefore, the failure to capture the true presence of the shadow economy and 
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the subsequently misrepresented official statistics lead to inefficient aid programs and 
misallocation of aid budgets (Eilat and Zinnes, 2000).  
Moreover, the shadow economy is highly associated with low institutional quality and 
hence potentially higher levels of corruption and less democracy (Teobaldelli and 
Schneider, 2013; Schneider, 2010; Razmi et al., 2013). Dreher and Schneider (2006) 
argued that the shadow economy and corruption are complements to each other in low-
income countries, meaning that high levels of shadow economy are linked to high levels 
of corruption. Therefore, corruption distorts the allocation of resources, including aid, 
enriches corrupt bureaucrats and promotes bad governance. In the presence of corruption, 
aid encourages rent-seeking behaviors and a further weakening of institutions. Hence, the 
core objective of aid fails, and economic growth is not achieved (Okumu, 2015, Svensson, 
2000). Additionally, Svensson (1999) argued that aid effectiveness is conditional on the 
degree of democracy in the recipient country. In less democratic countries, aid allocation 
is not productive and is not channeled for development purposes; instead, it is used to 
finance the government’s own non-productive activities (Svensson, 1999). 
Given the unobservable nature of the shadow economy, aid should target only the legal 
and official part of the economy. This invisible nature of the shadow economy influences 
the effectiveness of aid programs. In most cases, informal firms operating in the shadow 
economy do not have access to aid programs and budgets. Therefore, aid allocation and 
its direction might not be efficient due to a failure to acknowledge the existence of the 
shadow economy and a failure to target informal labor and firms operating in the hidden 
economy in the aid budget (Eilat and Zinnes, 2000). 
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3. Methodology  
3.1 Data description 
To examine the impact of aid on economic development in Egypt in the presence of the 
shadow economy, the following independent variables are used in the model: Net Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) as a percentage of GNI (AID), the share of total exports 
and imports as a percentage of GDP (openness), the gross enrollment ratio at a tertiary 
level (%) (education), foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP (FDI), credits 
provided by financial sector (percentage of GDP) (financial development), total 
employment as a percentage of the population (employment), capital formation as a 
percentage of GDP (capital), the share of personal remittances in GDP (remittances), the 
size of the shadow economy as a percentage of GDP (shadow) and a policy and 
institutional environmental indicator proxied by the Vanhanen index (policy). This index 
provides an objective measure of democracy by considering three aspects: the degree of 
electoral competition, the degree of electoral participation and a combined index of 
democratization. The index ranges from 0 to 100, from the lowest level of political 
openness to the highest level of political openness. The index is calculated by taking the 
product of the degree of participation and the degree of competition1 and subsequently 
dividing the product by 100 (Vanhanen, 2000). The data are available annually from 1976 
to 20132. The main dependent variable is real GDP per capita (development). The main 
source of the time series data covering the period under study is the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank (World Bank, 2016), except for total 
                                                          
1 The degree of participation is measured using the percentage of voters in the last election, and the degree 
of competition is the percentage of the vote for the smallest party in the last election (Vanhanen, 2000).  
2 The source is http://www.fsd.uta.fi/en/data/catalogue/FSD1289/meF1289e.html, accessed on 08 June 
2017. 
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employment, which is derived from the yearly bulletin of the National Bank of Egypt 
(NBE) from 1976 to 2013. The source for the shadow economy is Hassan and Schneider 
(2016). ODA is defined as “flows of loan disbursements made on concessional terms and 
grants provided by official agencies to countries and territories on the DAC list of ODA 
recipients.” The ODA conveys grants that include loans of at least 25 percent of the total 
grant (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 percent) (World Bank, 2016). The main 
objective of ODA is to promote the economic development and welfare of developing 
countries. The next important variable in our analysis is the relative size of the shadow 
economy compared to the formal economy. Hassan and Schneider (2016) applied the 
Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) modeling approach to estimate the size of 
the shadow economy as measured as a percentage of GDP. This confirmatory approach 
simultaneously considers different causes and indicators of the shadow economy instead 
of relying on only one proxy to measure the unobserved economy. The time series data 
are complete and annual from 1976 to 2013 for the case of Egypt. Table A1 in the 
appendix presents the details and summary statistics of the above variables.  
Based on the theoretical background discussed above, the main hypothesis is as follows:  
Hypothesis: The shadow economy has a decreasing effect on aid effectiveness in Egypt. 
 
3.2 Empirical estimation 
To test for the influence of the shadow economy on the effectiveness of aid in stimulating 
economic development in Egypt, the fully modified OLS (FM-OLS) method is applied. 
The FM-OLS model was developed by Phillips and Hansen (1990) and is chosen based 
on its two major advantages. Most importantly, the FM-OLS model accounts for co-
integration relationships among the variables by estimating a single cointegrating 
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equation. Thus, the first major advantage of FM-OLS is that it addresses the endogeneity 
problem. FM-OLS applies a semi-parametric correction to modify the least squares to 
account for serial correlation effects and endogeneity in the regressors that arise due to 
cointegrating relationships. The second advantage is that FM-OLS provides reliable 
estimates for small sample sizes (in our case, n=38) without influencing the quality of the 
estimators in a case of a low number of observations (Phillips and Hansen, 1990; Phillips, 
1993).  
Most macroeconomic time series data are trending and show data persistence over time. 
Thus, the data must be checked for stationarity. The first step in the FM-OLS model is to 
determine the order of integration of each variable. In this study, the Augmented Dicky 
Fuller (ADF) and Phillip-Perron (PP) unit root tests on the level data and the first 
differences of the variables are applied to determine the order of integration. Importantly, 
all of the variables are of order I=1, and none of the variables is I=2, which validates the 
application of the FM-OLS model to test the long-run relationship between aid and 
economic development given the presence of the shadow economy in Egypt. The results 
of the unit root tests are shown in Table A3 in the appendix.  
The second step in estimating the FM-OLS model is to determine whether the data share 
a common deterministic trend. Thus, the Johansen Test of co-integration is applied in 
order to determine the number of co-integrated equations and to verify the long-run 
relationship among the variables. Because the co-integration test is sensitive to the lag 
length, the optimal lag length chosen given the number of observations is lag =1. The 
Trace and Maximum eigenvalues are reported in Table A4 in the appendix. Based on the 
results of the unit root tests and the co-integration test, we find evidence of a long-run 
relationship between the variables; therefore, the FM-OLS model is applied to test for our 
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hypothesized relationship. Notably, differencing is not recommended because it leads to 
the loss of important long-run information among the cointegrated variables (Sims et al. 
1990). 
4. Results 
This section presents the main results of the FM-OLS model to investigate the 
effectiveness of aid (ODA%GNI) for development in Egypt in the presence of the shadow 
economy. To this end, the effectiveness and impact of aid on economic development are 
compared with and without the introduction of the shadow economy in the nexus while 
controlling for other important variables.  
In the first attempt in models (1) and (2) as shown in Table 1, the typical impact of aid on 
development is tested while controlling for other important variables mentioned in the 
literature without the introduction of the shadow economy. Based on the results of the 
estimation, aid has a significantly negative impact on economic development for the case 
of Egypt in the long run. This conclusion was also reached by Ali (2013), Abuelfoul 
(2013), and Emara (2013), who also examined the impact of aid on development in Egypt 
in the long run. This result supports the argument by various authors that aid does not 
necessarily lead to economic development. For the case of Egypt, the country suffers from 
a bad policy environment, bureaucratic corruption and macroeconomic instability, which 
dampens the impact of aid on development. Ali (2013) argued that the negative impact of 
aid on economic development in Egypt in the long run is mainly due to bad governance 
and inefficient policy-making processes.  
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Table 1: FM-OLS model 
Dependent variable: Economic Development  
Notes: This table summarizes the results of the FMOLS regressions conducted in Eviews. Economic development as the main dependent variable 
is proxied by GDP per capita in natural logarithm. The data are annual from 1976 to 2013 with no missing data.  * significance at 10%, ** 
significant at 5%, *** significance at 1%. T-statistics are in parentheses. Source: Author’s own calculation. 
                                                          
1 Residual diagnostic in the estimated model’s residuals is important for reliability of results. Table A5 
shows the results of the residual diagnostics including Correlograms -Q-statistics and Correlograms of 
Squared Residuals to check autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) in the residuals. The 
results show that the model is stable and satisfactory.  
 
   Variables/ Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)1 (12) (13) (14) 
AID -0.05*** 
(5.35) 
-0.002 
(-0.94) 
-0.02*** 
(-5.60) 
0.003 
(0.10) 
0.08** 
(2.58) 
0.07*** 
(2.69) 
0.06*** 
(2.65) 
0.04* 
(1.84) 
0.03 
(1.36) 
0.03** 
(1.96) 
0.04*** 
(3.54) 
-0.21 
(-1.49) 
-0.002 
(-0.07) 
-0.05 
(-0.59) 
Shadow   -0.04*** 
(-12.18) 
-0.04*** 
(-10.94) 
-0.03*** 
(-6.46) 
-0.02*** 
(-4.66) 
-0.02*** 
(-6.16) 
-0.03*** 
(-6.32) 
-0.03*** 
(-6.29) 
-0.03*** 
(-6.65) 
-0.02*** 
(-7.21) 
 -0.04*** 
(-10.32) 
-0.04*** 
(-9.91) 
SE*AID    -0.001 
(-0.74) 
-0.003*** 
(-2.97) 
-0.002*** 
(-2.98) 
-0.002*** 
(-2.93) 
-0.001** 
(-2.07) 
-0.001 
(-1.51) 
-0.001** 
(-2.15) 
-0.001*** 
(-3.76) 
 -0.0005 
(-0.57) 
-0.0002 
(-0.23) 
 
Policy             0.04 
(0.11) 
0.12 
(1.69) 
0.04 
(0.29) 
 
Policy*AID            0.27 
(1.15) 
 0.06 
(0.65) 
Education  0.01*** 
(8.09) 
  0.01*** 
(3.30) 
0.01*** 
(4.45) 
0.01*** 
(5.25) 
0.01*** 
(4.29) 
0.01*** 
(4.45) 
0.01*** 
(5.82) 
0.01*** 
(8.29) 
   
Employment  0.08*** 
(13.46) 
   0.02** 
(2.53) 
0.03*** 
(3.23) 
0.02** 
(2.55) 
0.02*** 
(3.46) 
0.03*** 
(4.62) 
0.04*** 
(7.69) 
   
FDI  -0.02*** 
(-3.62) 
    -0.01*** 
(-3.76) 
-0.02*** 
(-4.85) 
-0.01*** 
(-3.58) 
-0.01*** 
(-4.71) 
-0.001*** 
(-7.89) 
   
Financial 
Development 
 -0.001 
(-0.95) 
     0.001** 
(2.04) 
0.002** 
(2.28) 
0.001** 
(2.06) 
0.001** 
(2.43) 
   
Capital   -0.02*** 
(-8.29) 
      -0.005* 
(-1.94) 
-0.01*** 
(-2.83) 
-0.01*** 
(-4.17) 
   
Remittances  0.01 
(-8.30) 
       0.01** 
(2.46) 
0.002 
(1.12) 
   
Openness   0.003*** 
(3.88) 
        0.002*** 
(4.26) 
   
Adj R2 53% 96% 92% 92% 94% 95% 97% 97% 98% 98% 98% 60% 92% 92% 
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In the second attempt, the same relationship is tested, but in addition, the presence of the 
shadow economy and its impact on aid effectiveness in Egypt are controlled. To this end, 
an interaction term (SE*AID) is added to the specifications, together with the other 
controls that might influence the aid-development nexus. We also control for the shadow 
economy in Egypt, i.e., we take into consideration the existence of the shadow economy. 
The impact of aid on economic development becomes positive and significant. This result 
implies that aid programs that have an established aid agenda to tackle the shadow 
economy and to address the weak points in the formal economy that motivate individuals 
to join the shadow economy have a positive impact on economic development in Egypt 
over the long run by helping with the transition to formalize the shadow economy. 
However, the shadow economy has a diminishing and negative impact on the efficiency 
of aid for the case of Egypt, as indicated by the interaction term.  
Additionally, the impact of the shadow economy on the formal economy; i.e., economic 
development in Egypt, is negative. This negative relationship between the shadow 
economy and economic development was also found by Loayza (1996). The shadow 
economy leads to different negative externalities that influence the official economy. The 
shadow economy distorts the tax system, which leads to inefficient policy-making 
processes and the misallocation of official resources. Additionally, the shadow economy 
is persistent in corrupt and unstable political and economic economies, which discourages 
private foreign and local investors as well as foreign aid programs.  
The results shed light on the importance of considering the existence of the shadow 
economy and its interactions with the overall economy. The shadow economy reduced 
the efficiency of the aid received by Egypt, which has important implications for policy 
makers to consider the importance of tackling the shadow economy. To observe the full 
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picture regarding the impact and efficiency of aid, policy makers in Egypt need to take 
into account the shadow economy.  
The impact of education on development is positive and significant. This result implies 
that higher investment in education improves the quality of the labor force and increases 
productivity and output in the economy, thus increasing economic development. Elewa 
(2015) recently concluded that increased investment in human capital, i.e., education, 
increases economic development in Egypt over the long run. The author argued that 
education led to an increase in public revenues due to the increased capacity of labor to 
produce and increased employment levels, thus encouraging economic development 
(Elewa, 2015). By the same token, increases in employment and the expansion of the 
labor market increase labor productivity, output, consumption, and public revenues, 
which then leads to economic expansion and higher rates of economic development. 
Employment development decreases unemployment, which has a major negative impact 
on a country’s general economy and leads to economic stagnation and lower economic 
growth (El-Agrody et al., 2010).  
The impact of FDI on economic development through the integration of the domestic 
economy with global economies, through increased competition in the domestic economy 
of the host country, and through the transfer of new technologies and know-how is 
negative in the case of Egypt. The main argument is that the effects of FDI on the host 
country depend heavily on the country’s internal characteristics and conditions (Moura 
and Forte, 2010). Egypt’s economic, social and political status limits the positive effects 
of FDI on economic development. Egypt suffers from a prominent shadow economy, a 
high level of corruption of public servants, weak rule of law, high unemployment levels 
and population growth.  
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On the other hand, openness to trade has a positive and significant impact on economic 
development in the case of Egypt. Trade openness is considered an important engine of 
economic development, especially for developing countries. The positive link between 
increased openness and economic development occurs through increased production 
levels and investment capacity and higher employment (Idris et al., 2016). Based on a 
recent study, the impact of openness on trade for the case of Egypt given the aid-
development nexus is positive and significant in the long run (Sabra and Eltalla, 2016; 
Eamar et al., 2013).  
Furthermore, financial market development is a major contributor to economic 
development, especially in a developing country such as Egypt. Financial development 
impacts development positively through a reduction in the information and transaction 
costs required to obtain credit and by providing easy access to capital for productive 
projects (Hassan et al., 2011; Durusu-Ciftci, 2017). For the case of Egypt, Abu-badr and 
Abu-Qarn (2008) found evidence that financial development leads to economic 
development through enhanced efficiency and the mobilization of capital and resources 
for investment.  
Consistent with the literature on the case of Egypt, capital formation has a significantly 
negative impact on economic development. It has been argued that inefficiency in capital 
accumulation strategies and the combination of weak economic and political policies are 
major contributors to the negative impact of gross capital formation on the aid-
development nexus in Egypt (Ali, 2013). 
Finally, the impact of remittances on development for the case of Egypt1 is positive yet 
insignificant. Remittances are one of the most important sources of income from abroad; 
                                                          
1 For microeconomic studies on remittances in Egypt, please refer to Adams (1991) and Elbadaway and 
Rouchdy (2010). 
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however, they do not have a significant impact on long-term development because 
especially in a developing country such as Egypt, remittances are used for household 
consumption rather than productive investments that would boost long-term development 
(Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2006; Glytsos, 2005). 
Additionally, the importance of the impact of the policy and institutional environment 
and its interaction with aid on economic development in Egypt has been controlled. As a 
proxy of policy, the Vanhanen Index of Democracy is used. For the case of Egypt, a good 
policy environment does not play a significant role in influencing aid and its effectiveness 
in promoting economic development. Easerly et al. (2004) and Dalgraad and Hansen 
(2001) argued that the significance of the policy-aid interaction becomes weak when 
additional data become available, for example by expanding the dataset by a number of 
countries or adding controls and/or years. The authors also argued that Burnside and 
Dollar (2000) provided a major contribution to the literature, yet they did not furnish the 
final answer on aid effectiveness (Easterly et al., 2004), as policy and other channels such 
as the presence of the shadow economy also play roles in the effectiveness of aid, as 
shown by the results here. It is critical to note that the addition of the policy and 
institutional environment variable to models (13) and (14) in Table 1 shows that the 
importance of the direct impact of the shadow economy on the effectiveness of aid is still 
negative, yet it became not very important. The insignificance of both interaction terms 
highlights that neither the shadow economy nor the policy environment has a dominating 
role in influencing aid and its effectiveness. One can therefore conclude that the shadow 
economy in Egypt has a negative impact on aid and economic development, while a good 
policy environment promotes the effectiveness of aid. 
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Finally, the marginal impact of a 1% increase in aid on the income level is calculated at 
a 95% confidence interval, as shown in Figure 2, at different levels of the shadow 
economy in Egypt based on model 11 in Table 1. Because the effect of a change in aid on 
the income level is conditional on the size of the shadow economy in Egypt, it is important 
to go beyond the model coefficients per se and calculate the marginal effects of aid on 
income for different values of the shadow economy. This analysis shows that the positive 
impact of each additional increase in aid received by Egypt decreases as the size of the 
shadow economy increases. This result implies that an increasing size of the shadow 
economy in Egypt reduces the impact of aid on the level of income. Therefore, it is 
important for policy makers to tackle the shadow economy and reduce its size in order to 
manage its decreasing effect on aid.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the impact of the shadow economy on aid and economic 
development for the case of Egypt over a long period of time. Although many studies 
have focused on the aid-development nexus over recent decades, its application in Egypt 
and a focus on the existence of the shadow economy are limited. 
The shadow economy in Egypt is non-negligible and has retained a persistent share of the 
overall economy over time. Therefore, it is quite interesting to intersect the impact of the 
shadow economy with the aid-development literature, especially for the case of Egypt.  
The main contribution of this paper is the investigation of the impact of the shadow 
economy on economic development and aid effectiveness. The impact of the shadow 
economy on economic development is negative and has a dampening effect on aid 
effectiveness. The shadow economy affects the efficiency of the tax system through tax 
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evasion, which reduces government revenues and thus the quality of public goods and 
services. Additionally, the shadow economy is a source of resource misallocation that 
leads to the inefficient use and allocation of resources; namely, human resources, aid and 
capital resources. Additionally, the shadow economy distorts policy decisions due to the 
biases in official publicly available information and macroeconomic data. Most 
importantly, the existence of the shadow economy promotes corruption and instability, 
which ultimately discourages private foreign and local investors as well as foreign aid 
programs that have the objective of increasing economic development and enhancing the 
economy.  
A major policy implication is that the persistent existence of the shadow economy over 
time in Egypt poses a major challenge for policy makers due to its negative impact on the 
official economy and its dampening effect on aid effectiveness. Analyzing the 
intersection of the shadow economy in the aid-development nexus is novel and highlights 
the importance of tackling and formalizing the shadow economy in Egypt. Hence, the 
complete separation of the shadow economy and eliminating its interaction with the 
official economy are not possible. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Variables  
Variables Definition Source 
Development   Log of real GDP per capita is gross domestic 
product divided by midyear population. 
World Bank 
(2016) 
AID Net official development assistance (ODA) 
consists of disbursements of loans made on 
concessional terms (net of repayments of 
principal) and grants by official agencies of the 
members of the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC), by multilateral institutions, 
and by non-DAC to countries and territories in 
the DAC list of ODA recipients. Data are in 
percentage of GNI. 
World Bank 
(2016) 
Remittances Personal remittances comprise personal 
transfers and compensation of employees in 
cash or in kind made or received by resident 
households to or from nonresident households. 
Data are in percentage of GDP. 
World Bank 
(2016) 
FDI The net inflows of investment. It is the sum of 
equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other 
long-term capital, and short-term capital as 
shown in the balance of payments. Data are in 
percentage of GDP. 
 
World Bank 
(2016) 
Openness Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods 
and services measured as a share of gross 
domestic product. 
 
World Bank 
(2016) 
Education Tertiary school enrollment ratio is the ratio of 
total enrollment, regardless of age, to the 
population of the age group that officially 
corresponds to the level of education shown. 
 
World Bank 
(2016) 
Financial 
Development 
Domestic credit provided by the financial sector 
includes all credit to various sectors on a gross 
basis, with the exception of credit to the central 
government. Measured as percentage of GDP.  
 
World Bank 
(2016) 
Employment 
 
Total number of employed formally in the 
official economy relative to total population 
National Bank of 
Egypt – Yearly 
Economic Bulletin 
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Policy The Vanhanen democracy index. The index is 
calculated by taking the product of the degree of 
participation and the degree of competition 
Finish School 
Data Archive. 
FSD1289. 
Shadow  All economic activities that should have 
included in the national GDP. It excludes Do-it-
Yourself, criminal and voluntary activities. Size 
of the shadow economy is measured as % of 
GDP by MIMIC model.  
 
Hassan and 
Schneider (2016) 
Source: Author 
 
Table A2. Summary Statistics   
  
Develop-
ment AID Shadow  
Remitt- 
ances Capital FDI 
Open-
ness 
Educat
-ion 
Employ-
ment  
Finan- 
cial 
 
 
 
Polic
-y 
 
Mean 13041.02 5.17 28.00 7.49 22.98 2.45 53.81 44.05 26.87 87.74 
 
 
 
0.66 
 
Max. 19406.31 19.06 36.36 14.58 34.92 9.34 82.18 61.74 30.28 110.93 
 
 
 
1.4 
Min. 6960.22 0.18 17.94 2.86 14.44 
-
0.20 35.33 25.15 23.39 60.21 
 
 
 
0.55 
 Std. 
Dev. 3638.73 5.32 5.07 3.33 5.56 2.22 11.64 12.16 1.87 13.55 
 
 
 
0.18 
Obs. 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
 
 
 
38 
Source: Eviews  
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Table A3. Unit root tests (trend and intercept) 
Test/ 
Variables 
ADF PP 
Level First difference Level First difference 
Development -2.154116 -5.226815*** -3.372898 -5.237677*** 
AID -3.893857 -4.958795*** -2.543832 -5.095892*** 
Shadow -2.703984 -5.796701*** -2.703984 -5.792710*** 
Shadow*AID -4.082310*** -5.034534*** -3.082794 -5.207922*** 
Education -1.519074 -4.619053*** -1.820776 -4.623070*** 
Employment  -2.180602 -5.033227*** -2.005366 -5.029728*** 
Financial -3.217520 -2.928963 -2.455671 -5.020281*** 
Capital -3.631158 -5.231073*** -2.770590 -8.955722*** 
Remittances -2.637653 -5.776551*** -2.552618 -8.274319*** 
Openness -3.893047 -4.772640*** -2.475925 -5.315103*** 
Policy -2.91 2.03 -0.80 -6.38*** 
 
Source: Eviews  
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Table A4. Cointegration test   
  
Source: Eviews  
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Table A5. Residual Diagnostics based on FMOLS Model 11 
Correlograms -Q-statistics 
 
Correlograms of Squared Residuals  
 
Source: Eviews  
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Table A6. Cointegration test: GDP, AID, Policy, SE for models 12, 13, 14 in table 1 
 
Source: Eviews  
 
 
